Abstract-This paper analyzes the automated negotiation process between two competitive agents in an alternating offers negotiation model. Generally speaking, the outcome of a negotiation depends on some parameters-the agents' reservation prices, their attitude toward time and the strategies they use, etc. In most realistic situations, it is not possible for agents to have complete information about all these parameters for its opponent. However, it is general for agents to have partial information about these parameters for its opponent. Under such uncertain situation, our aim is to determine how an agent can exploit the available information in selecting an optimal strategy which maximizes its expected utility. Here, in particular, the optimal strategies are determined considering time constraint. Moreover, we set the concession constraints for each agent to assure the negotiation process is continually shortened. This design can assist researchers in AI (Artificial Intelligence) to construct software agents, where these intelligent agents can optimally negotiate on behalf of users in a given state of knowledge and context. 
I. INTRODUCTION
With rapid growth of electronic commerce, autonomous agents can play an increasing variety of roles in an automated negotiation system. Humans seldom negotiate effectively during negotiation process owing to limited information-processing capabilities [1] and biases [2] . Thus, automated negotiation has become an important research subject in the artificial intelligence (AI) field and economics field. Many studies have been done to solve this challenge in agent-based negotiation [3] - [6] . Automated negotiations exist in many different forms (see ref. [7] for a taxonomy). Here, we consider a particular class of automated negotiation; namely, alternating bargaining over a single issue (price) between two agents that both have firm time deadlines.
For solving bilateral negotiation problem, alternatingoffer bargaining protocol is the most predominant way in autonomous agent negotiation. The pioneering work about alternating-offer negotiation in economics field is  Manuscript received July 3, 2015; revised October 14, 2015.
Rubinstein's infinite horizon alternating-offer bargaining game [8] . Since there has a unique solution in this work, it has been applied to automated negotiation widely [9] . However this model assumes perfect information while takes time into consideration. There are also some works with incomplete information, outside options, etc [10] - [12] from the perspective of game theory. Faratin et al. ' s negotiation framework considers the agent's time deadlines and is not based on the assumption that both agents have perfect information [13] . They assumed both agents have limited knowledge and computational resources and studied the design of reasoning mechanisms in a service-oriented negotiation. Ren and Zhang [14] presented a bilateral single-issue negotiation model considering time constraint and nonlinear utility. Zhang and Chen [15] presented a sealed-bid negotiation model in which both agents simultaneously submit offers instead of alternating offer by introducing a mediator agent. Narayanan and Jennings [16] , [17] constructed a bilateral negotiation model through a Markov-chain framework, and gave an optimal strategy in incomplete information settings by bayesian learning. Fatima et al. [18] investigated the negotiation outcomes in an incomplete information setting based on time constraints and an agenda-based framework.
However, most existing researches assumed that both agents have perfect information, or incomplete information under time constraints. These works doesn't take into account the concession constraints. In this paper, we design an automated negotiation model with agents having partial information for its opponent, and analyze the optimal strategy of both agents. Especially, to assure the negotiation process is continually shortened, we set the concession constraints for both agents. The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section II presents our general negotiation model and constructs both agent's concession constraints. In Section III, we analyze how an agent can exploit the available information in selecting an optimal strategy which maximizes its expected utility. Section IV demonstrates the negotiation procedure by employing the proposed negotiation strategy. Finally, in Section V, we draw the conclusion and outline some directions for future plans.
II. NEGOTIATION MODEL

A. Alternating Offer Negotiation Protocol
Here, we use an alternating offers negotiation protocol for our study. Let p  . Otherwise it will offer a count-offer to the buyer agent. Such a procedure will be repeated until an agreement is reached or one agent reaches its time deadline. Thus, the action   a At, that agent a takes at negotiation round t is usually defined as follows:
Quit if t T A t Accept if U opponent s offer U counter offer
Counter offer otherwise
Concession constraints and utility functions
In this section, the concession constraints and utility functions of both agents will be introduced.
1) Concession constraints
In our proposed negotiation protocol, we set the minimal concession constraints for both agents to assure the negotiation process is continually shortened. Let a  denote the minimum concession that agent a has to make if the negotiation enter the next round, i.e., 
Since we set the minimum concession constraint for both agents, the negotiation process will be strongly monotonic and ensures convergence to a negotiation process.
2) Utility function The utility of each agent depends on the final agreement about the price and the negotiation round. We use the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function [19] to define the agents' utilities:
where a  is the discounting factor. Agent a 's utility from conflict is defined as   0 a UC  .
III. NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
The negotiation strategy defines the sequence of actions the agent takes during the process of negotiation. In our presented alter-offering model, the negotiation
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©2016 Journal of Automation and Control Engineering strategy determines the value of a counter-offer which, in turn, depends on some negotiation information. The information that an agent has about the negotiation parameters is called the negotiation environment. In order to determine an optimal strategy, an agent needs to find values of a counter-offer, on the basis of its negotiation environment, that maximize its expected utility.
A. Negotiation Environment
Each agent a has a reservation price a RP , a deadline a T , a sincere price a SP , a utility function a U and a negotiation strategy a S . These are an agent's own parameters, but the information it has about the opponent is not complete. The negotiation environment a E for agent a can be modeled as a 10-tuple:
, , , , , , , L are two probability distributions that denote agent a's beliefs about the opponent agent's offers at each round and time deadline. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that the system selects the buyer agent as first-offer agent. Therefore, the buyer agent submits first an offer to the seller agent at each round after it received the seller agent's offer of last round. We make the following assumptions from the perspective of the buyer (the same assumptions can be taken from the perspective of the seller agent):
1) 
C. Optimal Strategies
For convenience, the following discussion is from the perspective of the buyer agent (the same analysis can be taken from the perspective of the seller).
1) Expected utility
At any time t , the utility value of agent B has the following two possible situations: a) If 
The following proposition for agent S can be obtained using similar analysis and assumptions. 
3) Optimal strategies for both agents
Before the negotiation starts, agent a must submit the offer about ,, a a a SP IP T to the preset automated negotiation system. Both agents will receive respective concession constraints after the system calculated the concession constraint for each agent according to the introduced method in section Ⅱ. Note that we assumed that the system selects the buyer agent as first-offer agent. Based on the above analysis, the action agent a takes during the negotiation course of goes in the following steps: 
D. Negotiation Algorithm
Based on the above description, the extended negotiation algorithm is summarized as follows:
Step 1: Each agent assign negotiation parameters to the automated system before a negotiation starts, i.e., the initial offer a IP , the sincere offer a SP and the time deadline a T . The system calculates the concession constraint for both agents after it received the information of both agents, and informs them the concession constraint. Then the system selects randomly an agent a as the first offer, the negotiation starts.
Step 2: At any stage t, agent a submit the offer t a P to the opponent agent according to the above proposed optimal strategy, and wait for the agent's response. If the opponent accepts the offer, then the negotiation is completed with an agreement. Otherwise, the opponent will send back the counter-offer. If the current negotiation round is the agent's deadline, then the procedure goes to
Step 3. Otherwise, the procedure goes to Step 4.
Step 3: If the counter-offer can bring any profit to the agent, then the agent will accept the opponent's counteroffer, and the negotiation succeeds with an agreement. Otherwise, the agent will reject the opponent's offer, and the negotiation fails.
Step 4: The negotiation enters next round. If the opponent's counter-offer can bring more profit to the agent than the agent's offer for the next round, then the agent will accept the opponent's offer, and the negotiation succeeds with an agreement. Otherwise, agent a (B or S) will send the offers to the opponent according to the above propositions (proposition 1 or proposition 2), and the negotiation enters next round. The procedure goes to
Step 2.
IV. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we demonstrate the negotiation procedure by employing the proposed negotiation strategy between two agents.
We simulate the negotiation between a buyer and a seller on purchasing a piece of clothing online. We respectively set   the system select the buyer agent as the first offer. According to proposition 1 and proposition 2, we could calculate the offers of both agents at each round. Table I provides the offer process of the application of the application of the proposed negotiation strategy. is more than its current expected utility at round t=4. That is, the agreement is reached with the agreed offer 164.75 at the 4 th round.
In this section, we demonstrate the negotiation procedure between two agents with alternating offer by employing the proposed negotiation strategy. It can be seen that the negotiation length is rather short. It shows that the proposed negotiation model can efficiently shorten the negotiation process and successfully help agents to reach the agreement.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel alternating offer negotiation model was proposed. We determined what the optimal negotiation strategies are for both agents that find themselves with incomplete information. Specifically, we set the concession constraints for both agents in order to short the negotiation process. In the future we intend to extend our analysis to determine if this mutual strategic behavior leads to a equilibrium and then analyze if the proposed model can be implied to the in the real world by constructing a simulated Platform.
